Property, Place, and Public Discourse by Zick, Timothy
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 21 The Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment 
January 2006 
Property, Place, and Public Discourse 
Timothy Zick 
The College of William & Mary School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy Zick, Property, Place, and Public Discourse, 21 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 173 (2006), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/9 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173 
Property, Place, and Public Discourse 
Timothy Zick* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
For their effective exercise, First Amendment rights require ample 
and adequate places in which speakers and listeners can 
communicate.1 They require places where speakers and listeners can 
connect, communicate, and perhaps even confront one another. This 
Madisonian vision of public discourse is seriously threatened by our 
physical, spatial environment.2 We live in what might be called a 
socio-fugal environment. The character and properties of our 
architectures, of our public spaces, do not generally invite or 
encourage public discourse. Vast public areas have effectively been 
privatized. The public spaces that remain are often designed to 
facilitate commerce and recreation, rather than expression. 
Opportunities for truly public discourse, discussions of public issues 
that take place in public, are thus relatively scarce.  
Expressive rights are intimately connected to the concept of 
“place.” We must speak in terms of “rights” because the adequacy of 
place typically affects more than the right of an individual speaker to 
express herself. The rights to assemble and to petition the 
government for redress of grievances are also implicated in many 
constitutional disputes involving access to place. Many of these cases 
involve more than a single speaker, and hence implicate the rights of 
expressive association. Cindy Sheehan may have started a lonely 
 
 *  Associate Professor, St. John’s University School of Law. I would like to thank the 
conference participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (noting that First Amendment rights 
require breathing space). 
 2. Free speech has long been associated with ideals of democratic self-governance. See 
generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1st ed. 1948).  
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vigil in Crawford, Texas, to protest the war in Iraq and mourn her 
son’s death, but she did not remain alone for very long. And, of 
course, the rights of listeners and viewers to hear and see speech must 
also be considered. Public speech effectively invites public 
participation.  
Public expression is somewhat unique in this sense. Many 
constitutional rights are, in a sense, purely “private.” It is my personal 
right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches, to avoid self-
incrimination, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.3 To 
be sure, there is also social benefit in the recognition of those rights, 
but I do not require the participation of anyone else to effectively 
possess and assert them. They are not participatory in the same way 
as public expression.  
First Amendment rights require markets, public participation, and 
community dialogs. None of this is possible without place. With 
regard to speech exercised in public, these rights can be effective 
only if and to the extent that speakers and listeners are in the same 
places. It is thus self-evident that if there is to be a marketplace of 
ideas, if speakers and listeners are to self-govern in some meaningful 
way, they must have ample public room in which to do so.  
Place ought to lie at the center, rather than at the margins, of our 
constitutional discourse regarding freedom of expression. We should 
be as concerned with issues of place, or where, as we are with issues 
of what a person can legally communicate to others, or who may 
decide the scope of expressive rights, or why officials regulate 
speech.  
This, however, has not been the case. A set of spatial rules 
governing where speech may lawfully occur has gradually 
developed.4 But our current doctrines of place are as socio-fugal as 
our physical environment. It has been over sixty years since the 
Supreme Court identified any new “quintessential” public places for 
expressive activity. Public streets, parks, and sidewalks, officially 
 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures); id. 
amend. V (protecting the right against self-incrimination); id. amend. VIII (banning “cruel and 
unusual” punishment). 
 4. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 
(describing the public forum doctrine). 
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recognized in 1939 as presumptively open to expression, remain the 
only places to earn this distinction.5 Further, even in these places, 
speakers have only very limited “easements” for expressive activity.6 
Most public spaces are considered mere properties; they are treated as 
if they are owned by the government. The properties where the public 
gathers are treated as if they have little or nothing to do with 
expression. Under the First Amendment, they are analyzed 
categorically, functionally. Thus, malls exist to facilitate commerce.7 
Airports exist to facilitate travel.8 Under the current approach to 
place, there is no tradition of expression in these properties. Unless 
the government permits expression, no expressive tradition will ever 
transpire there. The upshot is that in the public places where people 
routinely gather, speakers have very limited rights to engage listeners 
on matters of public interest.  
Of course, speakers still have the right to expect that the content 
of their expressions will not be used as a criterion for allocating space 
for speech. When the government deems it necessary or expedient to 
utilize spatial restrictions on speech, it is required to “narrowly tailor” 
these restrictions and to ensure that “ample” and “adequate” 
alternative places are available for the displaced expression.9 These 
terms suggest a certain degree of spatial sensitivity. But in truth, as 
actually interpreted and applied, these are relatively minor limits, at 
least as compared to the fundamental expressive rights at stake. 
Today, access to public places is treated as more of an indulgence 
than as a fundamental right. It can be balanced away in favor of a 
growing list of interests, such as in governmental proprietorship and 
management, public order, aesthetics, privacy, repose, and now 
increasingly interests relating to “security.” This is so even in 
“quintessential” public places such as streets and parks. Indeed, it is a 
 
 5. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (recognizing streets and 
parks as public forums).  
 6. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1, 13 (arguing that speakers have “easement” for speech on public streets).  
 7. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that labor picketers had no right 
to demonstrate at a shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that 
protesters of the Vietnam War had no right to distribute handbills in a shopping center).  
 8. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–80 (1992) 
(holding that airports are non-public fora). 
 9. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
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testament to the fragility of the fundamental rights to publicly 
assemble and communicate that they may yield even to such 
seemingly trivial concerns as the harm that will come to public lawns 
by their mere exercise.10  
As troubling as this may be, we have entered a period of 
modernity that will even further challenge public discourse and our 
commitment to making room for public expression. The conditions of 
this late stage of modernity include: technological advance, social 
alienation, secularization, commodification, the erosion of physical 
boundaries and barriers, urbanization, diversification, 
democratization, and mobility. When we add the specter of terrorism 
to this list, it becomes apparent that public discourse is facing a 
substantial threat.  
The extent to which spatiality intersects with these conditions, and 
is in turn affected by them, is truly remarkable. Place, then, is a 
significant socio-legal issue. Socio-fugal doctrine threatens to 
exacerbate an existing socio-fugal physical environment. Conditions 
of modernity, in turn, will impact both the application of law and our 
spatial environment. Because we are lawyers and not architects or 
city planners, the physical environment naturally cannot be our 
primary focus. We must assume a general deficit of socio-petal, or 
speech-facilitative, places and architectures. We must instead ask 
whether our legal doctrines of place can accommodate public 
discourse given the spatial environment, the places, that we actually 
have. And if they cannot, we must consider what changes might be 
made to preserve the exercise of fundamental public speech rights.  
This Symposium focuses on the Rehnquist Court’s contributions 
to speech jurisprudence. The Rehnquist Court presided at a time 
when the aforementioned conditions of modernity were just 
beginning to affect our public spatial environment. As the Rehnquist 
Court took shape, the basic doctrines of place had substantially 
materialized. Speech had already been removed from malls. Place 
 
 10. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding 
prohibition on overnight demonstrations at the National Mall, in part on the ground that the 
lawn would be damaged); see also Timothy Williams, Keeping Great Crowds off the Great 
Lawn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at B1 (reporting that the New York City Parks Department 
intends to limit gatherings on the Great Lawn to 50,000 people, “a move that would end an era 
in which hundreds of thousands of people turned to the park as a place to protest”).  
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had been conceptualized as mere property. Public speech activity, 
which had been a great facilitator of the civil rights movement, was 
by then considered by many to be a public nuisance. But “place” was 
nevertheless still something of a work in progress. The Rehnquist 
Court’s stewardship of public places spanned a period that witnessed 
unique challenges to public expression. This Article will examine the 
Court’s responses to those challenges, with an emphasis on the 
manner in which its decisions regarding access to public places 
affected public discourse.  
How has the Rehnquist Court’s conception and treatment of 
“place” positioned us in terms of future possibilities for public debate 
and discourse? What sort of “expressive topography” has the Court 
fashioned, or at least contributed to? Does that topography encourage 
public debate and dialogue? Or does it facilitate separation and 
avoidance, driving speech further into private places? What impact 
has the Rehnquist Court’s approach had on the prospects for robust 
public discourse?  
I will argue that the Rehnquist Court largely left our “expressive 
topography” worse than it found it.11 As had predecessor Courts, the 
Rehnquist Court treated public places as little more than public 
properties managed by public officials. But its impact on public 
discourse actually extended beyond this. The Rehnquist Court 
diminished the scope of speakers’ rights in even quintessentially open 
places such as streets and sidewalks. Among other things, the Court’s 
decisions also tacitly approved the practice of zoning expression in 
public places. The Court even recognized a listener’s right to avoid 
offensive expression in public places. Finally, the Court refused to 
recognize any new “quintessential” public forums, places in which 
speakers can claim strong rights of public expression. Taken together, 
these developments substantially diminished the prospects for public 
discourse.  
In the final part of this Article, I will make broad suggestions as to 
how we might go about preserving discourse in public places. Part of 
 
 11. For additional discussions of the intersection of speech and spatiality, see Timothy 
Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439 
(2006) [hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech]; Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 581 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics].  
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the challenge is to recognize that public expression is not merely 
symbolically important. Protests and other public expressive 
activities are not mere historical curiosities. The world over, speakers 
continue to gather and express themselves in public places.12 Insofar 
as we view such exercises in our own country as ineffective or stale, 
we must ask what role our conception of place and corresponding 
doctrines play in affecting our exercise of public speech rights. It is 
imperative that speakers assert, on their own behalfs and on behalf of 
potential listeners, a constitutional right to place. Courts must finally 
be convinced to take “place” seriously.  
We cannot fault the Rehnquist Court alone for the current state of 
place under the First Amendment. The Court inherited the principal 
constitutional doctrines of place, namely the “public forum” and 
“time, place, and manner” doctrines, from prior Courts. But there is 
nothing constitutionally sacred about either of these doctrines. 
Indeed, “place” itself is not a self-defining concept. The Rehnquist 
Court, like its predecessors, chose to implement a particular 
conception of place.  
I will argue that the “forum” concept, which is rooted in principles 
of property, should be replaced by a distinct conception of “place.” I 
will sketch a concept of “place” that is rooted in inter-disciplinary 
treatments of place, rather than in narrow legal notions of property.13 
I will then use that conception of place to advance a different analysis 
of spatial issues as they impact public discourse. With regard to the 
“time, place, and manner” doctrine, I will argue that place should not 
only be conceptually, but also mechanically, severed from time and 
manner. Place is different from these other things; if public discourse 
is to be preserved, it must be treated as distinct.  
II. PLACE AND PUBLIC EXPRESSION  
Speech is, of course, wholly ineffectual without an audience to 
hear it. Speakers naturally seek to reach listeners in public places, 
 
 12. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Hopes Economy Plan Will Bridge Income Gap, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A9 (“The number of mass protests in China increased to 74,000 last 
year from 10,000 in 1994, according to police figures.”).  
 13. I have articulated this theory of “expressive place” in greater detail elsewhere. See 
supra note 11.  
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where they can be found in large numbers. They use places as 
platforms for making statements, for garnering attention, and for 
facilitating social interaction. Without these places, there can be no 
meaningful public discourse. The manner in which Courts have 
treated place conceptually and doctrinally under the First Amendment 
fails to appreciate this intersection of speech and spatiality. 
Conditions of modernity, including fundamental changes to our 
expressive environment, have only further complicated this already 
complex relationship.  
A. The First Amendment and Public Properties 
Initially, speakers naturally sought to reach listeners on public 
streets and sidewalks. This, of course, was where potential audiences 
were generally found at the turn of the nineteenth century. But then-
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., soundly rejected speakers’ “right” to assemble and 
communicate in these public places.14 The state, he said, owned the 
streets and sidewalks.15 Like any private owner of property, it could 
deny speakers access as it saw fit. 
Public discourse was saved, at least in principle, when this notion 
of ownership was seemingly rejected in Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization.16 The Hague Court stated, although in 
dictum, that wherever “title” to the public streets and sidewalks lay, 
these places were “immemorially” open to communicative activity, 
and in particular to “assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.”17 These particular places 
were held “in trust” by government for the benefit of the people. 
Hague actually settled very little in terms of access to public 
places. For one thing, it left vague the implications of the 
government’s status as “title holder” of public properties. For 
another, Hague’s commitment to speech rights in these quintessential 
 
 14. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895), aff’d Davis v. Massachusetts, 
167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897) (upholding government’s “right to absolutely exclude all right to use” 
streets and parks). 
 15. Davis, 162 Mass. at 512. 
 16. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 17. See id. at 515 (emphasis added).  
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public places was merely dictum. But Hague said enough to open the 
streets and sidewalks, and even listeners’ front doors, to the activities 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses and other pioneering public speakers.18 
Willing, undecided, and even unwilling listeners could thus be 
reached where they were most likely to be found—on the streets and 
in their homes. In public, at least, listeners were not protected from 
personal, intimate forms of communication. Indeed, not even their 
“personal” spaces were off limits to speech, unless they manifested 
their desire to be left alone.19  
In an influential article, Harry Kalven, Jr., read the Hague dictum 
and other cases that followed to support “a kind of First-Amendment 
easement” to the people to use streets and sidewalks as “forums” for 
expression.20 Kalven realized that the provision of public space was 
critical to the impending civil rights movement. Indeed, he correctly 
predicted that the civil rights movement would need the streets if it 
was ultimately to alter hearts, minds, and policies.21 Violent images 
of brutal police tactics in the streets played a significant role in the 
struggle against official segregation and private racism.22  
As it turns out, the civil rights era may have been a high-water 
mark in terms of access to public places for expressive purposes. In 
addition to the streets, sidewalks, and public parks, the Court also 
permitted civil rights protesters to access other public places, such as 
libraries, to convey their messages.23 And for a very brief moment in 
the early 1970s, the Court adopted the view that so long as the form 
of expression was not “incompatible” with a particular property, 
speakers ought to be able to reach listeners in that place.24  
 
 18. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 16–21 (noting activities of Jehovah’s witnesses and early 
solicitation cases). 
 19. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating ban on door-to-door 
solicitation). 
 20. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 13.  
 21. See id. at 11. 
 22. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 440 (2004) (recounting protest tactics in Selma and 
the public’s reaction to scenes of police brutality at street demonstrations shown on television). 
 23. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (invalidating a breach of peace 
conviction for a silent demonstration in a public library). 
 24. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (inquiring “whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a 
particular time”).  
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But in the 1970s, political and social changes altered the spatial 
environment. Listeners did not remain on the streets and in parks. In 
the 1970s, they moved, en masse, into malls and other commercial 
structures. Of course, speakers naturally tried to engage listeners 
there as well. But first labor picketers, and later Vietnam protesters, 
were excluded from these “private” places.25 Malls, it should be 
noted, closely resemble the “public squares” they replaced. However, 
the Court ultimately considered malls to be primarily commercial 
properties, not expressive places.26 Fifth Amendment private property 
rights trumped First Amendment rights to engage in public discourse 
in these locations.27 
Because they generally could no longer be found on streets and 
could not be reached in malls and other private commercial 
properties, speakers sought listeners in alternative public places. They 
claimed rights of access to the sidewalks near listeners’ homes, near 
schools, and adjacent to other public buildings.28 They attempted to 
gain access to public spaces such as public school mailboxes, military 
bases, and the advertising space on municipal buses.29 But in the 
1970s and 80s, speakers’ claims to these latter spaces routinely failed 
as well. The broad principles of the Hague dictum did not apply to 
these places either. The properties were public resources, yes, but 
they were not open to expression.  
It was not simply that the character of these places differed from 
streets, sidewalks, and parks. After the civil rights era, one could 
sense a broader shift in judicial, and perhaps public, attitude toward 
public discourse. Although this cannot be documented, one can well 
imagine that support for civil rights would not extend to labor pickets 
or Vietnam protests. Images of violence from these conflicts did not 
produce public solidarity, as had the struggle for civil rights. 
 
 25. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that labor picketers had no right 
to demonstrate at a shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that 
protesters of Vietnam War had no right to distribute handbills in a shopping center).  
 26. See Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569–70. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (picket outside mayor’s home); Police 
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (grounds near school). 
 29. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (public 
school mail facilities); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (bus advertising cards). 
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Whatever the level of public support, we can say for certain that 
judicial support did not extend to attempts to access listeners on 
military bases or through bus advertising cards. Indeed, as speakers 
pursued listeners in these relatively remote corners of society, judicial 
opinions seemed to signal that public assembly and speech were 
something of a nuisance to be controlled by government.30 Public 
expression interfered with governmental functions. It imposed speech 
on commuters. It was invasive. It caused tension in places, both 
public and private, where listeners expected peace and tranquility. 
Thus, after the civil rights era, the notion that speech needed only 
to be “basically compatible” with a property to be permitted there fell 
rather quickly out of favor. Henceforth, if public discourse was to 
take place on public properties other than streets, sidewalks, and 
parks, it was incumbent upon speakers to demonstrate that the 
government expressly and objectively intended that this be so.31 If 
they were to engage in public discourse in these places, speakers had 
to show not just that these properties could accommodate expression, 
but that they were specifically intended to be “forums” for 
expression, by showing that there was a history or tradition of 
expression there.32  
Not surprisingly, most public properties have failed to meet this 
test. In particular, new public places necessarily lack the requisite 
tradition of open exchange. They are thus classified under the Court’s 
now-familiar categorical approach not as “quintessential” public 
forums, but rather as either narrowly cast “designated” forums, 
principally designed to serve official purposes but with some room 
for speech activity; or as “non-public” forums (i.e., not forums for 
expression at all).33 There are no recognized “easements” for speech 
in these places. The properties that can be categorized as designated 
or non-public forums serve primarily official functions. Their 
managerial traditions generally preclude any argument that speech is 
 
 30. See, e.g., Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (recognizing that government, “no less than a private 
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated”). 
 31. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (describing the standard for “designated” public forum).  
 32. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) 
(discussing the intent requirement for designated public forums). 
 33. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44 (describing the “limited” public forum).  
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intended to occur there.34 The burden on the speaker to demonstrate 
otherwise is quite high.  
These “forums” were not intended to facilitate public discourse. 
They were intended, as are most properties, to serve more pragmatic 
functions. If a speaker is fortunate enough to demonstrate the 
requisite governmental intent to designate a place as open to 
expression, he or she is supposed to enjoy the same protection in that 
place as in quintessential fora such as streets and parks. But the Court 
has offered public officials sufficient leeway to regulate even these 
fora to their liking. In designated public forums, for example, the 
government can choose who speaks, and on what subject.35 Thus, 
although the government technically cannot engage in outright 
viewpoint discrimination in determining access to these public 
properties, there is sufficient flexibility in the standards such that this 
is precisely what appears to happen in some contexts. In non-public 
forums, the government is subject to few constraints; it must only act 
“reasonably” and avoid express reliance on the speaker’s viewpoint.36  
This type of categorization and treatment of public properties 
renders access to streets, parks, and sidewalks all the more critical for 
public discourse. But as other public spaces were cordoned off from 
discourse in the 1970s and 80s under the auspices of the forum 
doctrine, the Court also limited access to these “quintessential” public 
spaces under the other principal doctrine, the time, place, and manner 
doctrine. For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence,37 the Court upheld a prohibition on an overnight political 
demonstration on the National Mall, largely because of officials’ 
concern that the activity would damage the lawn.38 The opinion 
strongly suggested that so long as the government avoided allocating 
space based expressly on the content of expression, it would have a 
wide berth in managing public properties.39  
 
 34. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory 
of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1788–93 (1987) (discussing the distinction 
between “managerial” and “governance” authority over public properties). 
 35. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44 (describing the scope of governmental discretion). 
 36. Id. at 46. 
 37. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).  
 38. Id. at 299. 
 39. See id.   
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That discretion extended not only to public parks, but to other 
public places as well. Thus, flyers displayed on public spaces such as 
utility poles and billboards that cropped up as commuters spent more 
and more time in their cars could be treated as eyesores. Public 
speech of this sort fell under the government’s authority to manage 
the aesthetics of public properties.40 Thus, the notion that public 
discourse, or at least certain forms of it, could constitute a “nuisance” 
had become part of First Amendment doctrine.41  
Note that many of these “nuisances” had something in common. 
They involved not “pure” expression, but rather symbolic activity. It 
has long been suggested, but of course cannot be substantiated, that 
judges are biased against such forms of expression.42 This too may 
have contributed to a collective negative mindset regarding public 
expressive activity. Protests, mass demonstrations, leafleting, and the 
like are, of course, much more disruptive than is “pure” expression. 
But that very disruption, the speaker’s resistance of the status quo, is 
part of the message sought to be conveyed.  
In sum, for those interested in speaking in public, the 
unmistakable thrust of the post-civil rights era decisions is that places 
generally occupied by the public are not fit places for public 
discourse. For example, malls are “private.” Unless speakers can 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate otherwise, most other 
properties of which the government possesses “title” are not 
expressive forums. Listeners cannot be reached there. Even in those 
spaces “immemorially” open to public discourse, shifts in both 
 
We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O’Brien or the time, place, or 
manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the 
manager of the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge 
how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be 
attained. 
Id.  
 40. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
 41. Although cases like Community for Creative Non-Violence were, technically 
speaking, “manner” cases in that they purported to regulate the manner in which speakers 
conveyed their messages, they also attempted to protect public properties from perceived 
harms. Speakers could not sleep there in protest, billboards were out of place here, utility poles 
were not the place for political flyers, etc. 
 42. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 12 (suggesting that courts are biased against “speech 
plus”). 
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attitude and control have clearly taken place. Contrary to Kalven’s 
early and optimistic view, not even streets and parks, the 
“quintessential” public forums, can be “commandeered” by the 
people to make their collective point.43 The scope of the expressive 
“easement” in those places is uncertain, if it in fact still exists.  
B. Place and Modernity  
The past two decades have been politically and socially charged, 
even turbulent. We remain at war in Iraq and elsewhere. 
Simultaneously, we are fighting “culture wars” at home on issues 
ranging from racism to reproductive rights. Rhetoric can be sharp. 
Emotions, as always, can run high with regard to such charged issues. 
Public passion can quickly lead to public violence. In some sense, 
this is nothing new. Similar tensions existed during the 1960s and 
70s, for example.  
What is new, however, is the extent to which communication has 
been technologically enhanced. Much of the discussion today takes 
place via electronic media, including cable television and the 
Internet. But as recent war, political convention, and global trade 
summit protests have demonstrated, streets, sidewalks, and parks 
remain significant parts of our public dialogue. Modernity has 
ushered in new technologies. But, for reasons that will be explored 
below, it has not ushered out the resort to public places.44 Speakers 
still routinely seek to reach listeners face-to-face and in public.  
As always, the resort to public places puts pressure on officials to 
maintain public order. This tension is heightened today by something 
else that is new, namely the concern over terrorist attacks. In the 
public’s mind, these fears may justify limitations on constitutional 
rights such as privacy and speech.45 The combination of heated 
rhetoric and security concerns is one of the defining characteristics of 
public places of modernity. Taken to their extreme, safety and 
 
 43. Id.  
 44. See infra Part IV.A. 
 45. See generally Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public Opinion and Privacy 
Page, http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last visited May 16, 2006) (collecting polling data 
that demonstrates increased concern for security after September 11, 2001, and less salience for 
privacy issues). 
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security concerns could effectively destroy real public discourse in 
this country. There is, in any event, no question that “place” post-
September 11 is not the same as it was prior to the events of that day. 
The question is what effect this will ultimately have on public 
discourse.  
It is not simply that our rhetoric is heated and divisive and that our 
physical safety in public places is threatened. The conditions of 
modernity have affected the very mechanics of public speaking and 
public listening. Listeners are on the move again. In addition to malls 
and other places that I have already discussed, people can be 
increasingly found in airports, in subway cars and stations, at large 
public auditoriums, and, of course, in their cars going to all of these 
and various other places. Today’s listener is a constantly and rapidly 
moving target, not at all prone to stay in place. Speakers must 
therefore constantly change locations to find an audience. They must 
lay claim to the few public places where listeners are likely to be 
found. This will naturally lead to an increase of intrusions into places 
one might otherwise think of as “private.”46 Conditions of modernity 
thus raise new issues of spatial privacy. Which places are fit for 
public discourse, and which are not?  
Enhanced mobility substantially affects the intersection of speech 
and spatiality. It raises the question whether listeners are still 
reachable in public. Recognition of the constitutional right to engage 
in door-to-door solicitation was a significant victory following the 
move toward mass suburbanization.47 But listeners are not home 
nearly as often now. They spend more time at work and at other 
“private” places in which speakers cannot engage them. They drive 
on super-highways, or take public transportation. They spend more 
and more time waiting in places of transport such as airports and train 
stations. If listeners cannot be reached on streets, or in malls, or in 
these other modern places, they may indeed be unreachable in any 
public places.  
 
 46. Recent restrictions on protests near funerals are merely one example. See Tenn. 
County Bars Protests near Funerals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 27, 2005, available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15985. 
 47. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating ordinance 
prohibiting distribution of handbills to residences). 
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The changes brought on by modernity are not just reflected in the 
character and availability of public places; the speech that happens 
there, when it does happen, is also different. Merely finding an 
increasingly mobile audience is difficult enough, but even when 
speakers locate an audience, it is increasingly difficult to obtain and 
maintain its attention. Speakers thus resort to outsized and 
provocative billboards to reach listeners in their cars, where they 
spend increasing amounts of time.48 They may become generally 
more aggressive in their methods, and more inclined to push speech 
onto listeners wherever they can be found.49 In this environment, 
places we might not generally think of as terribly important to public 
expression, even seemingly trivial ones like highway overpasses or 
utility poles, can actually be quite critical.  
The act of listening, both privately and in public places, has also 
undergone dramatic changes. Advanced technologies enable listeners 
to filter opinions with which they disagree.50 This is true not only in 
listeners’ private places, such as at their personal computers or in 
their living rooms, but increasingly in public ones as well. Even 
while they are on the street, listeners have developed special tactics 
for controlling the speech that they hear. They utilize personalized 
technologies, including cell phones and MP3 players, that permit 
them to avoid hearing anything other than the limited discourse they 
choose not to filter. Thus, as they go from place to place, listeners 
increasingly occupy a personal speech-free zone.51  
In sum, public places of modernity are under pressure from a 
range of sources, including political, cultural, and environmental 
changes. Public discourse itself is changing, with listeners resorting 
to self-help to protect their own privacy and repose in public. 
Listeners are moving. And speakers are following, eager as always to 
 
 48. See Christine MacDonald, Billboards in Your Face, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 2005, at 
C1 (noting the rise of billboards as a means of advertising in recent years).  
 49. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Wrapping Historical Subway Columns in Modern Ads, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at B3 (late edition) (noting the use of historical columns in Times 
Square subway station for commercial advertisements). 
 50. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (discussing the phenomenon 
of listener filtering through technology). 
 51. See David Carr, Taken to a New Place, by a TV in the Palm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2005, at 4–3 (late edition) (“So this is how we end up alone together. We share a coffee shop, 
but we are all on wireless laptops. The subway is a symphony of earplugged silence. . . .”). 
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find the largest possible audience for their messages. As the 
Rehnquist Court convened, however, many of the places where the 
public typically gathered, such as malls, had already been deemed 
legally and constitutionally “private.” Many other places were 
considered either narrowly limited forums for expression, or not open 
to expression at all. The extent to which even streets, parks, and 
sidewalks could be “commandeered” by speakers, and the scope of 
their expressive “easement” there, were in rather serious doubt. In 
some respects, then, the fundamental free speech question facing the 
Rehnquist Court was whether there was still a place for public 
discourse.  
III. THE REHNQUIST COURT, PUBLIC PROPERTY, AND PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE 
In his important article, Harry Kalven, Jr., asked whether the 
constitutional treatment of “place” was up to its next challenge—a 
civil rights movement that would depend partly on access to public 
places for its success.52 We should ask similar questions in light of 
the unique challenges facing public discourse in our own time. Our 
places are modern ones. People, and speech, are increasingly mobile. 
Our “culture wars” and the “war on terror” present unique problems 
in terms of access to public places. We should ask whether the 
doctrines of place are tailored to meet the spatial realities of our time, 
and of times to come.  
With these questions in mind, this Part examines the Rehnquist 
Court’s stewardship of public places. Over the course of some twenty 
years, the Court placed an indelible mark on public places. The 
principal argument advanced here is that the Court made public 
discourse decidedly more difficult, indeed altogether less likely to 
occur. Like previous Courts, the Rehnquist Court granted broad 
authority to officials to manage public places as if they were nothing 
more than properties. But more than this, the Court diminished the 
expressive “easement” in places such as streets and sidewalks; 
encouraged the tactical use of place and expressive zoning; refused to 
recognize new “quintessential” public forums; recognized a right to 
 
 52. Kalven, supra note 6.  
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privacy in quintessentially expressive public places; and generally 
limited speakers’ abilities to make intimate appeals to listeners in 
public places by broadening the right not to listen there.  
A. Quintessential Forums and Expressive Easements 
The Rehnquist Court continued the tradition of determining access 
to public places with reference to property principles and metaphors. 
Kalven suggested that while the government might possess title to 
public properties such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, speakers and 
listeners possessed an expressive “easement” to use them.53 These 
properties were held “in trust” by government for the people.54 
According to the Hague dictum and the forum doctrine, these are 
properties in which public speech rights have historically been 
presumptively protected.  
On the one hand, the Rehnquist Court read the “immemorially 
open” dictum in Hague very narrowly, effectively precluding the 
recognition of any new “quintessential” public forums.55 By 
definition, new properties have not “immemorially” been used for 
expressive activity. I shall have more to say about the effects of this 
particular conception of “tradition” later, and about the effect of the 
Court’s narrow conception of tradition under Hague. It suffices here 
to say that the Court’s refusal to expand the category of 
“quintessential” public fora failed to account for the many changes 
that occurred in the spatial environment in the six decades after 
Hague was decided. The Court’s notion of “tradition” essentially 
limited the types of public property ostensibly open to public 
discourse to only three: streets, sidewalks, and parks. Modern places, 
by which I mean any new public properties or classes of properties, 
are now presumptively closed to public discourse.  
 
 53. Id. at 13. 
 54. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of 
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). 
 55. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding 
that only properties that have “immemorially” been used for expressive purposes qualify as 
“quintessential” public forums). 
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At the same time, the Rehnquist Court paid too little attention to 
the spirit of the Hague dictum. Its decisions show that even 
recognized “quintessential” public forums are in fact less 
quintessentially open to expression than the language of Hague 
would suggest. Speakers, it turns out, are not necessarily on safe 
constitutional ground merely because they are standing on properties 
such as streets, sidewalks, or parks. In fact, the Court further 
obscured what, if anything, a speaker gains by being in these places.  
Three sidewalk cases demonstrate the effective demotion of the 
quintessential forum under the Rehnquist Court’s approach. In United 
States v. Kokinda,56 the Court indicated that not all sidewalks are 
created equal. The sidewalk in Kokinda happened to be located next 
to a postal office.57 Based on the history of its use and the postal 
service’s stated interests in preserving that use, that sidewalk was 
deemed a non-public forum.58 Ordinarily, the Court refuses to view 
properties with this sort of specificity, preferring instead to deal with 
them more categorically. Kokinda indicated that a speaker cannot 
simply assume that all sidewalks are “quintessential” public forums. 
Indeed, some such public properties might not be open to expression 
at all.  
Even if the sidewalk retains its “quintessential” label, the 
expressive “easement” there can take on a substantially diminished 
character. In Hill v. Colorado,59 speakers were prohibited from 
approaching within eight feet of abortion clinic patrons to dissuade 
them from having the procedure.60 The appeals of these “sidewalk 
counselors” were to occur on public sidewalks as the patrons entered 
the clinic.61 The Court accepted that the sidewalk was a 
“quintessential” public forum.62 However, it held that the patron’s 
“right to be let alone” on public sidewalks limited the speaker’s 
expressive “easement” there.63 The patron’s interests in privacy and 
 
 56. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 730. 
 58. Id.  
 59. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 60. Id. at 707. 
 61. Id. at 708. 
 62. Id. at 715. 
 63. See id. at 717–18 (discussing the clinic patron’s “right to be let alone” on sidewalks).  
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repose outweighed the speaker’s right to make an intimate appeal on 
a public thoroughfare.64  
Finally, in Frisby v. Schultz,65 the Court upheld an ordinance that 
prohibited entirely peaceful “targeted picketing” on the sidewalk 
outside an abortion provider’s home.66 Like Hill, Frisby was also 
based in part on notions of “privacy” and “captivity,” this time as 
applied to the home. The Court held that whatever “easement” people 
enjoyed on public sidewalks, it did not permit speakers to effectively 
trap a person inside his or her home.67 Thus, to protect the sanctity 
and privacy of the unwilling listener’s home, the Court held that 
nearby sidewalks were off limits to this form of public speech 
activity.  
Public properties deemed presumptively open to expressive 
activity have always been few in number. If there is any guarantee of 
access to public places, it applies only to public streets and sidewalks 
and in public parks. The Rehnquist Court held that no other 
properties would qualify for this special spatial status. Moreover, 
even if a speaker appeared on one of these seemingly favored 
properties, the Court recognized substantial limits on his or her 
“easement” there. Today, although streets and sidewalks remain 
critical to public discourse, it is far from clear what special status 
these properties retain. It is equally unclear what a speaker actually 
gains from being in these places, as opposed to someplace else.  
B. Expressive Zoning  
The dilution of public speech rights in even “quintessential” 
public forums is also the product of a recent trend involving what I 
have elsewhere referred to as “spatial tactics.”68 As noted, one of the 
challenges with respect to places of modernity is the tension created 
by safety and security concerns. Spatial tactics, which represent the 
now-common official response to these concerns, consist of officials’ 
 
 64. Id. at 718. 
 65. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).  
 66. Id. at 476, 488. 
 67. See id. at 486 (“The devastating effect of targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of 
the home is beyond doubt[.]”).  
 68. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11. 
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use or manipulation of place to contain, segregate, and control 
expressive and associative activity. These tactics are now routinely 
utilized on public streets and sidewalks. They result in the “speech-
free” and “free-speech” zones that have appeared during recent 
political campaigns; at war protests; on university campuses; at 
public facilities including abortion clinics and courthouses; and, most 
recently, at (of all places) funerals.69  
The zoning of expressive and associative activity is a socio-legal 
development largely of the past two decades or so. It thus coincides 
with the Rehnquist Court’s tenure. Cultural unrest brought about by 
war, partisan politics, race relations, abortion politics, and threats of 
terrorism has contributed substantially to this trend. Legally and 
constitutionally, however, its roots can be found in three lines of 
Rehnquist Court precedent. The first, discussed above, cast some 
doubt on the significance of being in a “quintessential” public forum. 
The second is the Court’s speech zoning precedents. The third is the 
Court’s modification or restatement of the time, place, and manner 
doctrine. The combination of these things has contributed to, if not 
encouraged, the utilization of spatial tactics as a means of controlling 
public discourse.  
Public officials have long used zoning measures to control the use 
of property.70 If places such as streets, sidewalks, and parks are 
considered mere properties, one can easily imagine officials 
controlling their “expressive uses” through zoning as well. This 
practice or tactic began with local zoning of sexually explicit or 
“adult” speech. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.71 and, 
more recently, City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,72 the 
Rehnquist Court approved zoning measures that dispersed or 
concentrated adult expressive uses. It did so even though some of 
these zoning measures directly targeted the expression being 
regulated. The zoning measures were nevertheless treated as 
“content-neutral” on the ground that they addressed the harmful 
 
 69. See id. at 589–606 (describing the proliferation of speech zoning). 
 70. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding 
comprehensive local zoning plan). 
 71. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 72. 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
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“secondary effects” associated with strip clubs and the like, rather 
than any expressive content associated with the dancing.73  
The Court approved these zoning laws despite the fact that they 
were most likely content-based, and that their likely effect was to 
suppress, rather than merely regulate, expression. Writing for the 
majority in City of Renton, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed no 
sympathy for the adult businesses’ argument that there was little 
alternative space to be found in the area. This, he said, was a function 
of the vagaries of the local property market.74 Local officials were 
entitled to substantial deference in dealing with the “secondary 
effects” of adult uses.75 They were not required to facilitate the 
relocation of the displaced speakers by ensuring that adequate 
alternative properties were available.76 Indeed, public officials’ only 
obligation was to “refrain from effectively denying” the adult 
businesses’ right to operate.77 This is an effective way of controlling 
a form of expression many find objectionable by largely displacing it. 
Offensive entertainment businesses can be placed in zones with 
similar offending businesses; or they can be dispersed, creating 
“smut-free” zones throughout a community.  
Three years after City of Renton, the Court announced a standard 
for time, place, and manner regulations that encouraged even more 
widespread application of expressive zoning and other spatial 
regulations. This standard was announced in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism,78 a case involving the regulation of sound equipment in 
Central Park. Time, place, and manner regulations of this sort had 
been governed by a form of intermediate scrutiny that required 
“narrow tailoring” of content-neutral speech regulations.79 But in 
Ward, the Court clarified that so long as a regulation does not 
suppress “substantially” more speech than is necessary to serve the 
government’s stated interests, and so long as those interests would be 
 
 73. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–49 (explaining the “secondary effects” theory). 
 74. Id. at 54. 
 75. Id. at 51–52. 
 76. Id. at 54. 
 77. Id.  
 78. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 79. See, e.g., Clark v.  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291 (1984) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a ban on overnight camping). 
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less well served absent the regulation, local officials were to be given 
deference.80 The dissenters vigorously complained that this standard 
essentially nullified any tailoring requirement for time, place, and 
manner regulations.81 Whether Ward went that far or not, it certainly 
did bring time, place, and manner scrutiny much closer to rational 
basis review than to intermediate scrutiny.82 
In sum, as a result of decisions like Kokinda and Frisby, speakers 
no longer have the benefit of a presumptive easement in 
“quintessential” public speech fora. City of Renton demonstrated that 
ordinary zoning principles could be used to target and displace 
certain offensive expressive uses.83 Ward loosened the standard that 
applies to spatial regulations. As a result, officials increasingly have 
relied upon zoning principles to subtly displace, rather than overtly 
suppress, expression.84  
This is precisely what occurred in Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center, Inc., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, and Hill v. Colorado, 
three abortion clinic protest cases decided during the Rehnquist era.85 
The cases involved separating protesters from clinic properties and 
patrons by means of spatial tactics such as “buffer zones” and 
“bubbles.” The terms themselves even sound in spatial tactics. The 
Court did not uphold all of the zoning measures in these cases.86 But 
it did validate, once again, the general principle that speakers and 
listeners can be separated by means of zoning, even if it carves up 
public properties such as streets and sidewalks. Taken together, these 
 
 80. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–800. 
 81. See id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the majority replaces 
constitutional scrutiny with mandatory deference”). 
 82. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. 
L. REV. 615, 644 (1991) (“The government interest and tailoring requirements are quite close to 
the rational basis standard applied to regulations that do not affect fundamental rights at all.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 83. The Rehnquist Court did indicate that the “secondary effects” theory is of limited 
applicability. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (rejecting a claim that a 300-foot 
speech zone around an embassy targeted “secondary,” rather than primary, speech effects).  
 84. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding, under strict scrutiny, 
the use of a 100-foot speech-free zone near polling places).  
 85. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 
(1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 86. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773-75 (invalidating 300-foot “approach and offer” and 
residential picketing provisions).  
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three cases suggest that all speech, not just “adult” speech, can be 
concentrated or dispersed based on ordinary zoning principles.  
The combination of these lines of authority has emboldened 
public officials to use place as a means of controlling potentially 
disruptive expression. During the past several years, there has been a 
rise in the use of what are variously referred to as “demonstration 
zones,” “buffer zones,” “free speech zones,” and “speech-free 
zones.”87 In the 1980s and 90s, college campuses once again became 
flashpoints for racial and other tensions. Unlike when campus 
violence erupted in the 1960s, this time officials were ready. They 
resorted first to speech codes, and then to spatial zoning to reign in 
charged campus expression.88 In the 1990s, abortion “counselors” 
mounted protests at health care clinics. Once again, spatial tactics 
such as zoning were used to limit speakers’ access to listeners.89 War 
and other political protests have also given rise to the use of zoning 
tactics. Entire areas of cities have been declared “speech-free” 
zones.90 For example, at the most recent national party conventions, 
protests were sharply limited through spatial tactics.91 At the 
Democratic National Convention in Boston, officials even resorted to 
building an enclosed zone in which speakers were told they must 
hold their demonstrations.92  
Political dissent has been a major casualty of this new spatial 
order.93 Insofar as the success of political and social movements 
depends on things like freedom of movement, ease of assembly, and 
spontaneous expression, these tactics present substantial obstacles. 
 
 87. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11, at 589–606 (describing the trend 
and its effects).  
 88. See id. at 601–04 (discussing speech zones on campuses). 
 89. See Hill, 530 U.S. 703 (upholding statute that limited protester’s access to abortion 
clinics and clinic patrons). 
 90. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a restricted 
zone as valid time, place, and manner regulation); Citizens for Peace v. City of Colorado 
Springs, No. Civ. A. 04CV00464-RPM, 2005 WL 1769230 (D. Colo. July 25, 2005) (upholding 
security zone that closed all public streets around the hotel). 
 91. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11, at 592–95 (discussing recent 
limits on public protest, particularly political protest). 
 92. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding the 
use of a protest cage to house demonstrators at the 2004 Democratic National Convention in 
Boston). 
 93. See generally Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11. 
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They separate speakers and listeners in public places. They facilitate 
listener avoidance of expression that is presumptively offensive or 
dangerous, a presumption arising from official displacement. 
Listeners are “protected” not only from the speakers, but from their 
messages as well. In the course of protecting itself and its officials, 
the government is driving protest into corners and placing it, quite 
literally, in pens and cages.  
These structures are manifestations of a general sense that, to 
paraphrase Kalven, every protest is a danger to society, and every 
gathering in public a mob.94 They are, stated differently, the most 
recent manifestation of the concept of public-expression-as-nuisance. 
This “nuisance” is dealt with not by encouraging confrontation and 
an exchange of ideas, or by protecting the right of speakers to dissent 
and protest, but by official policies of spatial separation, avoidance, 
and control. Speakers generally cannot reach out to public officials in 
public places; nor can they readily access their more general intended 
audiences. We see this dynamic at work in our most significant and 
symbolic public ceremonies. For example, the first Bush inauguration 
was as spatially open as any of its predecessors. The second, 
however, took place in a city wrapped, as one journalist put it, in a 
“steel cocoon.”95 Protesters at the second inauguration were hidden 
behind bleachers and in other out-of-the-way places. Kalven 
suggested that the openness of our public places is an “index of 
freedom.”96 The trend toward zoning public expression and of 
carving up our public places is an indication that neither the 
expression itself nor the places in which it occurs are held in high 
regard.  
We must, of course, have a degree of order on the streets.97 
Officials must be kept safe. So must speakers and listeners. But the 
balance between order and security on one hand, and the exercise of 
public speech rights on the other, is now skewed sharply in favor of 
the former. Make no mistake: spatial tactics and place are used to 
 
 94. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 32. 
 95. See David Johnston & Michael Janofsky, A Steel Cocoon Is Woven for the Capital’s 
Big Party, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A16.  
 96. Kalven, supra note 6, at 12. 
 97. See id. at 10–11 (distinguishing between revolution, civil disobedience, and protest). 
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affect this balance. Courts, hesitant to second-guess official spatial 
policies in the first place, are now discouraged from doing so by both 
the extraordinary breadth of official control over public property and 
the leniency of the Ward standard. So long as officials can articulate 
a legitimate and content-neutral interest and displacement serves that 
interest in some minimal fashion, the zoning of speech will continue 
to be permitted. 
It is, of course, impossible to definitely link, in a causal sense, 
cases such as Kokinda, City of Renton, and Hill to the culture of 
tactical zoning we now see in many public spaces. A confluence of 
legal, political, and social forces have given rise to spatial tactics. 
What we can say, however, is that these Rehnquist Court decisions 
together created the conditions for a new spatial order. They signaled 
a judicial willingness to tolerate restrictions on public discourse 
through the regulation of public property, with reference to property 
principles and theories of managerial control. They treated zoning as 
a presumptively neutral way to manage public speech and to limit 
expressive “easements” on public properties. These decisions 
regarded public officials less as “trustees” of public property than as, 
once again, its rightful owners.  
C. Placelessness 
Modernity displaces people. This does not necessarily carry 
negative connotations. Technology breaks down barriers, enabling us 
to travel virtually anywhere and to communicate with anyone 
regardless of where we, or they, happen to be. We are a people 
constantly on the move. In a world in which boundaries keep coming 
down, we find ourselves inhabiting a world comprised of 
undifferentiated, homogenous, transitory space. In this spatial 
environment we sometimes experience what anthropologists have 
called “placelessness.”98 We spend less and less time in culturally 
vibrant and significant places—and more and more time in 
undifferentiated spaces. 
The phenomenon of placelessness affects public discourse. The 
modern listener spends more and more time in airports, train stations, 
 
 98. See EDWARD C. RELPH, PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS (1976). 
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bus stations, and on subways, trains, and buses. He or she is 
constantly traveling along highways and superhighways. If these are 
the places we are more likely to inhabit, we must ask: What are the 
possibilities for public discourse there? How can these modern public 
places be incorporated into our expressive culture?  
Consider an ordinary highway overpass. Under the categorical 
approach, as applied by the Rehnquist Court, it is highly unlikely—
not impossible, but highly unlikely nonetheless—that this type of 
property will be considered an expressive “forum.”99 The government 
will, in all likelihood, not have invited speakers to express themselves 
there. Nor is expression the primary function of these structures or 
the reason they are built. Like so many modern places, overpasses 
would be treated as physical conveyances, not as speech forums. So 
long as the government has a reasonable explanation for prohibiting 
speech there, it may do so; driver safety and aesthetics come readily 
to mind as two eminently “reasonable” justifications upon which the 
state might rely.  
Listeners might still be reached as they travel on the highways. 
Radio broadcasts and billboards will beckon for their attention. But 
radio and billboards are means of communication that belong to 
relatively wealthy interests. As things now stand, the “poorly 
financed causes of little people” are quite unlikely to reach listeners 
in these places of modernity.100 In this way, and in others rarely 
appreciated, the allocation of place tilts the marketplace of discourse 
in favor of those with resources. When one considers how difficult it 
is to reach listeners in this day and age, highway overpasses and other 
similar public properties where messages might cheaply be conveyed 
become far more important to public discourse than their doctrinal 
treatment indicates.  
Placelessness gives rise to even more significant problems in 
terms of public discourse. Speakers have moved from place to place 
over time, seeking opportunities to interact with listeners in public 
places. Speech was first prohibited in malls because they were 
considered “private” properties. Speakers then moved to airports and 
 
 99. But see Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 536 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
highway overpass, as part of a sidewalk, constituted a traditional public forum).  
 100. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
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other large transit hubs, where vast numbers of people now gather on 
a daily basis, but speech has generally been prohibited there as well. 
The Rehnquist Court refused to recognize any additional 
“quintessential” public forums. In International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, the Court held that airports have neither 
the tradition nor the functional characteristics associated with streets, 
sidewalks, or parks.101 With regard to tradition, the Court reasoned 
that airports as a class are new structures, far too recent in vintage to 
support the idea that speech has “immemorially” been permitted in 
them.102 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the function of airports 
is to facilitate travel, not speech.103 Thus, in these “non-public” fora, 
and presumably in all similar modern facilities, government may 
effectively prohibit expression so long as it acts reasonably and does 
not expressly base its regulation on the speaker’s viewpoint. In Lee, 
the Rehnquist Court closed the class of “quintessential” public fora to 
all properties other than public streets, parks, and sidewalks—the 
places mentioned in 1939 in the Hague dictum. 
The flaws in the Court’s stated rationale are almost too obvious to 
be taken seriously. As Justice Kennedy (who has incidentally proven 
to be the Court’s most spatially sensitive member) noted in 
concurrence, the function of streets is just as clearly to facilitate 
movement rather than speech, yet streets are deemed “public 
forums.”104 Only Justice Kennedy seemed to grasp the larger 
implications of Lee. He understood that the case involved not merely 
access to an airport, or to airports as a category of property, but rather 
the denial of access to listeners in some of the only modern public 
places where they might regularly be found.105 Anticipating that new 
places or properties were bound to arise in the future, Justice 
 
 101. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 681–82 (1992). 
 102. Id. at 680 (noting “the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its 
appearance”). 
 103. Id. at 682 (noting that “the record demonstrates that Port Authority management 
considers the purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the 
promotion of expression”). 
 104. Id. at 696–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 105. See id. at 697–98 (noting the forces of modernity and their effects on public 
discourse). 
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Kennedy espoused a far more flexible forum analysis, one that came 
closer to the “compatibility” standard of the early 1970s.106  
Unfortunately, the majority did not share Justice Kennedy’s 
spatial sensibilities. The Court did not connect its forum 
determination with the modern problem of placelessness. It did not 
connect the problem to prior decisions prohibiting expression in other 
typical gathering places like malls. By freezing the category of 
traditional or quintessential public fora, the Court created a situation 
that will result in the proliferation of what anthropologists and human 
geographers call “non-places.”107 More and more public places will 
simply be devoid of expression and of expressive culture. They will 
be undifferentiated spaces, rather than meaningful places.  
D. The Right Not to Listen: Public Privacy and Captivity  
Modernity has also given rise to two other phenomena that impact 
public speech rights. First, as a result of urbanization, immigration, 
and other forces, we now have less space in general, and less personal 
space in particular, than we used to. Second, social alienation is on 
the rise again. This alienation manifests itself in the aforementioned 
“culture wars,” social and political battles over things such as 
abortion, religion, war, the rights of homosexuals, and race. 
Zoning, which separates speakers and listeners and thereby 
facilitates a degree of physical avoidance, can be used to relieve some 
of the pressures associated with crowding and cultural conflict. 
Spatial tactics lessen the opportunities for public confrontation. But 
sometimes these tactics are not enough. Sometimes an individual 
speaker insists on getting very close to an undecided or unwilling 
listener. Often, listeners object strongly to such invasions of their 
personal space. 
At least where gated communities have not arisen, the home is 
one place where speakers might still locate otherwise mobile 
listeners. But in Frisby v. Schultz, as discussed above, the Rehnquist 
 
 106. See id. at 695 (proposing that a place should be a public forum if it is suitable for 
discourse in terms of its physical character and is compatible with other uses). 
 107. See MARC AUGÉ, NON-PLACES: INTRODUCTION TO AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
SUPERMODERNITY (John Howe trans., 1995). 
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Court held that a small group of abortion protesters did not have the 
right to engage in “targeted picketing,” however peaceful, on the 
sidewalk near an abortion provider’s residence.108 In Frisby, the 
Court was particularly skeptical that the picketers sought to convey a 
message to the public at large.109 Even if they were, the Court held 
that they could not do so by effectively thrusting their message on an 
unwilling listener in his home.110  
Frisby involved an admittedly delicate balance. It is, of course, 
reasonable to protect a person from being essentially trapped, or held 
“captive,” in his or her home. On the other hand, Frisby might also be 
interpreted as further support for protecting listeners from offensive 
speech by limiting expression in public places. The Court gave little 
thought to how manner restrictions, perhaps limitations on the 
number of picketers, their volume, or their timing, might mediate this 
tension. It relied instead on place, and on the notion that principles of 
residential privacy and “captivity” can limit public discourse that 
takes place on public streets. This might be less troublesome if 
speakers could readily reach listeners elsewhere. But the fact is that 
they often cannot. Having lost the battle over places such as abortion 
clinics, speakers moved to confront the abortion provider where he 
could more readily be reached, his home. By relying on listener 
“captivity” to prevent speech on the sidewalk, the Court set a 
dangerous precedent. If principles of privacy apply in this context, 
why not by extension to public places where listeners might argue for 
repose? Why not to funeral processions, for example, or to the streets 
outside hospitals?  
In the event, the Rehnquist Court did not confine principles of 
privacy and captivity to the home. Hill v. Colorado upheld a statutory 
eight-foot protective “bubble” around abortion clinic patrons as they 
traversed the public sidewalks near clinics.111 The statutory bubble 
 
 108. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988). The law in Frisby might 
plausibly have been interpreted to prohibit all use of public sidewalks in subdivisions. Through 
some artful limiting, however, the Court managed to narrowly confine its holding to standing 
outside a person’s home and essentially picketing the homeowner while therein. See id. at 482–
83 (providing narrow construction).  
 109. Id. at 486. 
 110. See id.  
 111. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730 (2000) (upholding an eight-foot bubble as a valid 
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was not expressly designed to protect the patrons from violence, but 
rather from public discourse. We know this, in part, because the 
statute prohibited approaching a patron for the purpose of “oral 
protest, education, or counseling.”112 In context, if not on its face, the 
statute discriminated based on content. The Court upheld it 
nonetheless, as a tailored means of protecting access to the clinic 
(which was not really compromised in light of other statutory 
restrictions on protesters), psychological repose, and clinic patron 
privacy.113  
This “public privacy” rationale bears some emphasis. The Court 
had previously been reluctant to embrace the principle of “captivity” 
on public properties.114 Yet the listeners in Hill, who were on public 
sidewalks before they reached the clinic doors, were nevertheless 
held to be “captive” to the speech of the protesters. According to the 
Court, the patrons possessed a right not to listen, based on personal 
privacy, even while occupying a quintessential public forum.115 This 
holding, if it is more than an abortion-speech anomaly, has 
substantial implications for public discourse. Do listeners have a 
more general right not to hear speech in public places? Lest anyone 
think the notion farfetched, some courts have held as such. The 
captivity/privacy rationale has been applied to busy intersections, 
highways near homes, subways, library lobbies, and public 
monuments, among other places.116 As a result of decisions such as 
Frisby and Hill, the “right not to listen” may play an increasingly 
 
place regulation).  
 112. Id. at 707. 
 113. Id. at 730. 
 114. The Court has traditionally insisted that while in public, listeners must avert their eyes 
or otherwise avoid offensive expression. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205 (1975) (outdoor movie theater); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (public 
courthouse). 
 115. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.  
 116. See Frye v. Kan. City Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
restrictions on display of aborted fetus signs at a busy intersection); Texas v. Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a Klan application to participate in the 
“adopt-a-highway” program); ACLU v. Mineta, 319 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2004) (limiting 
advertisements in subway system); Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l Library Sys., 
235 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (involving a free literature table in library lobby closed to 
expression); Wash. Tour Guides Ass’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 808 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(upholding regulation of solicitation at national monuments). 
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important role in determining the scope of modern public 
discourse.117  
Limitations on access to “personal” spaces represent yet another 
limitation on public discourse based on spatial rationing. The home 
must, of course, be protected to some degree. But it is not altogether 
clear that manner and time restrictions cannot provide sufficient 
protection in all but the most unusual circumstances. Bubbles and 
buffers can render certain messages wholly ineffective. There is a 
world of difference between delivering an intimate appeal in hushed 
and reverent tones and delivering it, over the din of protest, from 
eight or more feet. Moreover, insofar as Hill is interpreted to support 
a more generalized notion of public privacy, certain forms of public 
discourse will be rendered all the more difficult, and all the more 
ineffective. In modern public places, speech increasingly takes place 
only from “safe” and “comfortable” distances, if it occurs at all.  
IV. “PLACE” AND THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE  
The Rehnquist Court’s property/place decisions negatively 
affected the prospects for public discourse. To be sure, the Court in 
many cases simply followed precedent. For example, it applied a 
conception of place as mere property that has been circulating at least 
since Hague’s now-famous dictum. Since the 1970s, government 
officials have steadily gained managerial authority over public 
properties under the “forum” doctrine.118 The Rehnquist Court’s 
decisions certainly continued that trend. But more than this, the 
Court’s decisions further reduced the public space available for 
expressive activity. Cases such as Frisby, Kokinda, and Hill 
diminished speakers’ expressive “easements” in places where they 
had been thought to be well established. The Court placed its 
imprimatur on the now-ubiquitous tactic of expressive zoning. 
Finally, the Rehnquist Court refused to recognize any new 
presumptively open fora for public speech.  
 
 117. See generally Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be 
Spoken to?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153 (1972) (reviewing the doctrine of captivity and analyzing 
the right not to receive expression). 
 118. See Post, supra note 34, at 1733 (discussing official, managerial authority over public 
properties).  
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It is perhaps tempting to casually dismiss these developments. 
After all, technology has brought so many other speech “forums” into 
being in the past twenty years that it can hardly be said that there is a 
deficit of speech in this country. This Part argues that, despite the 
proliferation of electronic speech fora, providing material public 
space for speech remains critical to the health of our expressive 
culture. Rather than abandon them, we must preserve public places 
such that public debate and expression continue to occur there. 
If meaningful public discourse and expression is to be preserved, 
“place” must be brought from the background to the foreground of 
speech analysis. The First Amendment itself recognizes the 
significance of “place” to public expression. Thus, speakers need not 
rely solely on old Supreme Court dictum to press claims to public 
places. There is, at least in some limited sense, a constitutional 
“right” to place. But to convince courts to recognize this right, 
“place” must be defined; more than this, it must be treated as an 
independent constitutional concept. A meaningful concept of place 
that reconnects speech and spatiality must replace dated and speech-
restrictive notions such as trusts, expressive “easements,” and 
“forums.” As elsewhere, I will draw on the work of scholars in other 
disciplines to sketch a conception of “place” that differs from 
property and forum.119 I will explain why “place” as conceptualized 
should be preferred, and what a spatial analysis based on “place” 
might look like. Finally, after establishing “place” as a distinct 
concept, I will argue in favor of not only conceptually but also 
mechanically separating place from things such as “time” and 
“manner,” and of reviewing spatial restrictions strictly.  
A. Private Filters and Public Speech Events  
Before seeking to reconceptualize place and spatial analysis, it 
bears emphasizing how important place is to public expression. With 
all of the new communications media available, one must wonder 
why speakers even bother to utilize public places like streets and 
parks. There are several reasons why these and other public places 
 
 119. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 11; Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 
supra note 11, at 617–25 (discussing the theory of “expressive place”). 
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remain critical to public expression. First, given the increased ability 
of listeners to use technology to filter speech they do not wish to 
hear, public places are one of the last locales where the undecided 
listener might be reached.120 In Republic.com, Cass Sunstein 
examined the manner in which various technologies have enabled us 
to hear only what we want to hear.121 He argued that an 
individualized “Daily Me” filters messages with which we disagree 
and otherwise fragments our expressive environment.122 This 
threatens to diminish the communication opportunities that tools such 
as the Internet and satellite technologies appear to offer. Sunstein 
worries that the “sidewalks” and other “forums” that cyberspace and 
other new media create will not be open avenues of communication, 
but rather narrow vehicles for self-selected opinion reinforcement, 
which leads to errors, confusion, group polarization, and other 
evils.123 
These are serious concerns, and they are closely related to this 
Article’s focus on opportunities for public discourse and expression. 
If, as Sunstein argues, technologies of modernity effectively enable 
listeners to ignore speakers in private, the physical places we occupy 
together become even more critical to public discourse. Under these 
circumstances, streets and sidewalks cannot be considered merely 
symbolically important to the marketplace of ideas or relics of times 
past. If we can avoid what we do not want to hear in private, perhaps 
the only opportunity for meaningful public discourse will occur in 
public places. In modern times, it is only in these places that speakers 
have an opportunity to “impose” their views on undecided or 
“unwilling” listeners.124 It is only there that things such as political 
dissent will be heard.  
Second, public places offer a platform for making a collective 
statement in a manner that the Internet cannot replicate. Things such 
as movement, volume, mass, and emotion do not exist in online 
 
 120. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 50 (discussing the phenomenon of listener 
filtering of information through advanced technologies). 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 7. 
 123. See id. at 51–86 (discussing the dangers of consumer filtering). 
 124. Of course, those with few or no resources or with no Internet connection have no 
choice but to make their point in freely accessible public places.  
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settings, or at least are differently experienced. As I have suggested 
elsewhere, the Internet and other communications forums can provide 
powerful supplements for speech that takes place mainly in private.125 
However, they cannot reproduce the sense or character of place. They 
cannot replicate the emotive aspect of being somewhere and speaking 
to listeners there.126 They cannot facilitate or replicate conflict. 
Perhaps most importantly, speech that takes place in technological, 
metaphysical fora is not generally going to be heard by government 
officials. The reason is simple—the argument that speech is easy to 
avoid, to filter out, applies to public officials as well. Metaphysical 
speech competes with a cacophony of other speech for the attention 
of busy lawmakers and other officials. This, surely, is part of the 
reason why people continue to gather in public places to demonstrate 
the world over.127 Those who view public speech and protest as 
outmoded or ineffective should keep two things in mind. The first is 
the continued prevalence of the practice, which indicates it has 
special meaning, at least for those who participate. The second is the 
possibility that the lack of spontaneity or emotion one sometimes 
witnesses in the streets is not necessarily a manifestation of public 
disinterest; it may instead be a product of spatial tactics and other 
regulations of place that together have sapped protests of all vitality.  
Third, and related to the desire to make a collective point, protests 
and demonstrations in public places tend to garner substantial media 
attention. The public cannot easily avoid these events when they are 
covered by one or more media outlets. Likewise, public officials can 
far more readily ignore a massive spam-like email campaign than 
they can the latest “million-something” march. These are public 
events. They become matters of public concern, particularly when 
officials react with violence or other tactics of control. Protests and 
demonstrations, as events, can become the story. This may dilute the 
speakers’ message somewhat, but it may also engender sympathy for 
their cause. In any event, it certainly gets the message noticed.  
 
 125. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11, at 648–49. 
 126. Imagine viewing a painting at the Guggenheim Museum, or seeing the Last Judgment 
at the Sistine Chapel. Now imagine viewing these things on the Web, as part of a “virtual” tour. 
 127. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Hopes Economy Plan Will Bridge Income Gap, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A9 (“The number of mass protests in China increased to 74,000 last 
year from 10,000 in 1994, according to police figures.”). 
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Fourth, it may simply be that technology-based communication 
has become so routine and familiar that speakers are beginning to 
long for more traditional face-to-face interactions. If this is so, rather 
than a societal trend that shuns public places in favor of the private 
fora of technology we may indeed witness a return to real public 
places. This only becomes more likely as the initially public resource 
of the Internet becomes subject to private property divisions or 
constructs; access to public streets and sidewalks requires no 
password, no credit card, and (at least at this point in time) no form of 
identification or validation whatsoever.  
Finally, in addition to having tangible significance, public places 
are indeed symbolically important. Their openness is, as Harry 
Kalven suggested, an “index of freedom.”128 Public places are far 
more than mere museum parcels. They remain a critical component 
of self-governance and the marketplace of ideas. It is especially 
important that we see, hear, and experience truly public speech 
activity in this country, and it is important that speakers have an 
opportunity to assemble and to engage the public and public officials 
on matters of pressing public concern. The symbolic significance of 
public speech does not lie in its success at persuasion or in its 
erudition. It lies in the fact that public speech events are part of a 
distinct expressive culture.  
B. A Right to Place 
Although it does not mention it by name, the Constitution 
acknowledges the importance of “place” to expression. The First 
Amendment protects not only the freedom to speak, but also the right 
of the people “peaceably to assemble.”129 It protects the right to 
“petition the government for a redress of grievances.”130 It protects, 
by implication, the right to associate with others, and to gather and 
 
 128. Kalven, supra note 6, at 12. 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“The 
right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is 
equally fundamental.”); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 292–98 (1970) (discussing rights to assembly and petition). 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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speak together with them in public places.131 Self-governance and 
marketplace theories recognize that these public rights are empty 
without places where listeners and speakers can be brought 
together.132  
Speakers therefore need not cling solely to the exceedingly thin 
reed of the Hague dictum for the proposition that there is a 
fundamental right to place. Yet despite this constitutional 
recognition, the Rehnquist Court, like its predecessors, refused to 
acknowledge spatial facilitation as a constitutional obligation of 
government. Even the streets and sidewalks were constitutionally 
downgraded. Also, the Court refused to recognize any additional 
“quintessential” speech fora. As in other First Amendment contexts, 
the Court chose to focus instead solely on content discrimination.133 
Thus, even when where is the most pressing issue, doctrine dictates 
that courts continue to focus on questions of why.134 “Place” has now 
been effectively subsumed by considerations of content distortion.135 
In other words, although there is a right to official neutrality there is 
no right to place.  
If we still believe in some form of public democratic governance, 
place must be reincorporated into First Amendment discussions. 
Speakers should not be shy about staking a constitutional claim to 
place. This does not by any means entail treating such right as 
absolute. Nor does it mean that the right to place should replace the 
right to neutrality when considering issues of speech and spatiality. 
But neither should spatial facilitation be considered, as it is now, to 
be outside of judicial competence or consideration. Given the 
 
 131. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (noting that public 
protest is “an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form”). 
 132. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2. 
 133. See Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of 
Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 101–03 (explaining the “Distortion” and “Enhancement” 
models of the First Amendment).  
 134. See id. at 104 (arguing that public forum doctrine should be considered a “whole-
hearted rejection” of the idea that government has a duty to provide space for expressive 
activity). 
 135. A focus on distortion can sometimes have the incidental effect of making room for 
private speech on public property. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993) (invalidating a refusal of a church’s request to display a 
religious-oriented film series on school premises). It does less well, as the Rehnquist Court 
decisions demonstrate, in preserving public speech on public property. 
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constitutional recognition of place, courts should far more carefully 
consider the impact that spatial regulations have on opportunities for 
public discourse. In order to do that, they must first have a proper 
conception of “place.”  
C. Property, Forum, and “Place” 
In Hague, place entered First Amendment discourse as nothing 
more than a form of property. The government held title to streets 
and sidewalks, but it held them in trust for the people.136 But if public 
expression is to remain vibrant, place cannot continue to be treated 
this way. It cannot be parceled out and carved up with reference to 
simplistic property analogies such as “easements,” “zoning,” and 
“trusts.” Place must be updated to take into account modern 
conditions such as listener mobility, private filtering, societal 
displacement, and other circumstances. Place thus cannot be 
preserved by reference to simple analogies, or by slight tweaks to 
existing forum doctrine.137 Sixty years of experience, including the 
recent twenty-year-plus Rehnquist Court stewardship of public space, 
suggests that the concept of “place” itself must be reconsidered. 
Fundamentally, we must change what judges see when they 
consider public space. A distinct concept of “place” is precisely what 
is missing in analyses of speech and spatiality, including the 
Rehnquist Court’s treatment of public places. As I have argued 
elsewhere, law provides a very limited and constraining conception 
of “place.”138 If place is to be refashioned, we must look elsewhere 
for insight and understanding. There is, fortunately, no shortage of 
material. Robust discussions of “place” have occurred in disciplines 
 
 136. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of 
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to 
Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1567–75 (1998) (proposing several modifications to public 
forum doctrine); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 
50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 311 (1999) (proposing an analysis based on an analogy to the common 
law of nuisance). 
 138. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11; Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, 
supra note 11. 
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ranging from philosophy, to human geography, to anthropology.139 
Studies in these and other disciplines indicate that there is a marked 
difference between property and forum, the concepts that currently 
dictate spatial analysis in speech cases, and place. I will explore, in 
necessarily general terms, the principal differences between these 
concepts. I will then suggest both why and, in terms of analysis, how 
we should begin to incorporate a particular concept of “place” into 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Property is, of course, fundamentally a thing, or res. As presently 
conceived, a “forum” is simply a type of property on which 
government permits some expressive activity. Simply put, a “forum” 
is an abstract categorical construct used to classify properties. When 
judges consider place, it is as a mere backdrop for expressive activity. 
When issues of speech and spatiality arise, courts examine “property” 
issues, not issues of “place.” They ask about the function of the 
property, or class of properties, or about their traditional uses.140 
Public space is generally treated as a resource that governments 
allocate among competing uses. Expressive uses are often treated like 
any other typical use of property.  
Place differs from property and from forum in that it is more than 
mere background for expressive activity. Place is constitutionally 
bound to expression. It does not exist separately from speech, but 
constantly intersects with it. Place should thus be considered primary 
to expressive rights. Although the Rehnquist Court’s decisions, like 
those of the 1970s, treated place as merely a secondary aspect of 
expressive activity, these precedents actually highlight the primacy of 
place. They demonstrate what happens to public discourse and 
interaction when access to streets is diminished, forum categories are 
frozen, place is zoned and parceled, placelessness takes hold, and 
speakers and listeners are separated. The Court’s decisions created a 
spatial order that substantially decreased opportunities for public 
expression, assembly, and petition. 
 
 139. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11, at 617–30 (discussing inter-
disciplinary research on place). See generally THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: 
LOCATING CULTURE (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga eds., 2003). 
 140. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–83 
(1992) (discussing airport terminal properties). 
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The conventional property-forum paradigm also assumes that 
public space, like air, water, or any other public resource, is a brute, 
rather than constructed, fact. A “forum” is treated as the product of 
presumptively neutral and “objective” governmental allocations of 
place. This obscures the power of place to substantially skew public 
discourse. While it may be possible to view properties in purely 
functional terms, it is not possible to view place in this way. A place, 
unlike a property or forum, takes on meaning only as it is utilized by 
speakers and listeners. Each place is a unique social construct. Courts 
should acknowledge the functional capacities of places and their 
compatibility with expressive activity, but these should not be 
determinative of speech rights. They do not offer a complete picture 
of place. The analysis should focus on how a place is actually used 
and by whom, and why this place, as opposed to some other, is 
preferred by speakers.  
As constructs, places are also dynamic in a way that properties 
and forums are not, and indeed cannot be. Places can themselves 
communicate something about social and political contests. In part, 
this is because speakers are often intimately connected to places. 
They write on, or inscribe, public places. Speakers and listeners 
develop a connection to certain places—what one anthropologist has 
called “topophilia.”141 There is no analog for this phenomenon with 
respect to properties or forums.  
Conceptually and physically, then, “place” is broader than 
property or forum. It is not limited to the physical space a speaker 
occupies, such as a sidewalk. In Frisby, for example, it was actually 
the listener’s home, not the sidewalk, that was the relevant “place.”142 
This is where the abortion practitioner lived. The home was the site 
of a social contest. Similarly, the abortion clinic was one of the places 
involved in the speech controversy in Hill. In these cases and others, 
particular places were actually elements of the speech controversy. 
They could not be wholly separated from the expression at issue. 
Speakers often insist on speaking in a particular location because the 
 
 141. See generally YI-FU TUAN, TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION, 
ATTITUDES, AND VALUES (Morningside ed. 1990).  
 142. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1998) (discussing the importance of 
home). 
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“place” relates closely to their message. In other instances, places 
symbolize conditions, conflicts, emotions, or collective memories on 
a broader scale. The National Mall in Washington, D.C., is such a 
place. It represents a history, one that is written each time a new 
event takes place there. Unlike properties, then, places do not merely 
exist. Places happen; they are events.  
The fact that place intersects with expressive activity in various 
ways suggests that we should think of place as a highly variable 
concept. Properties and forums may be susceptible to the current 
simplistic categorization of “traditional,” “designated,” and “non-
public” fora.143 But places are more varied and complex than this. 
Indeed, if we conceptualize places with reference to the manner in 
which they are utilized, the messages they communicate, and their 
general cultural impact, we can conceive of an entirely different 
typology of places, an “expressive topography.”144 I will elaborate on 
this concept below. The basic idea is that courts should not merely 
separate classes of properties—streets, airports, etc.—into formalistic 
property categories. They should instead identify and analyze distinct 
places, sites that are primary to expression, constructed, dynamic, 
and variable.  
Courts should adopt this spatial perspective because it describes 
with far greater accuracy the manner in which speech and spatiality 
intersect on the ground, where expressive activity takes place. 
Viewing place as expressive more accurately captures the insights of 
anthropologists and other scholars who have demonstrated how 
people actually use and relate to place. It comports with what can 
happen to public expression when place is manipulated. Now, when 
they consider issues of spatiality, courts devote nearly all of their 
energy to categorizing property. A concept of “place” based on the 
principles set forth above will return attention to the substantive 
intersection of speech and spatiality.  
 
 143. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) 
(discussing forum categories). 
 144. See generally Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 11. 
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D. Determining Access to Places Rather than Properties  
Focusing, then, on the variability of place, we can map an 
expressive topography by identifying places in terms of their 
intersection with expression, the manner in which place is utilized, 
and the manner in which specific spatial regulations impact the 
remaining places on the expressive topography. In other words, we 
identify places by connecting them with speech, rather than by 
separating them from it, as forum analysis typically does.145  
1. A Topography of Places 
Seen from this perspective, the Rehnquist Court’s stewardship of 
public space affected a number of discrete spatial types. Its 
expressive zoning and time, place, and manner decisions ultimately 
gave rise to what might be called tactical places, the products of 
spatial tactics such as cages and speech zones.146 Those precedents 
also effectively limited speakers’ access to inscribed places. These 
might be public spaces such as highway overpasses on which 
speakers seek to post or write their messages. They are also sacred 
places such as the National Mall and Central Park, where a robust 
expressive culture and public “topophilia” have developed over time.  
The Court also contributed to the modern phenomenon of 
placelessness by effectively validating the creation of non-places. 
These are places where large numbers of the public gather, but where 
expression is generally forbidden. They are modern places, such as 
shopping malls, airports, and other transport terminals, where speech 
on matters of public concern is not permitted to interfere with private 
commercial activity. Because of the Court’s narrow focus on property 
functions and traditions, new places such as these cannot be deemed 
presumptively open to expression.147 The Court also limited speaker 
 
 145. The concept of the expressive topography, and each of the spatial types in the 
discussion that follows, are examined and explained in greater detail in Zick, Space, Place, and 
Speech, supra note 11. The spatial labels are borrowed principally from THE ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF SPACE AND PLACE, supra note 139.  
 146. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11. 
 147. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) 
(holding that an airport is a “nonpublic” forum).  
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access to embodied places, the personal spaces of listeners. This type 
of place was at issue in Hill, in which the Court recognized a public 
right to privacy on the public streets near abortion clinics. There is, 
finally, reduced access now to what might be called contested places. 
These are places that are themselves at the center of political or social 
conflicts, such as the home in Frisby or the abortion clinics in Hill 
and Madsen. 
This brief description is not intended to cover the entirety of the 
expressive topography.148 Nor, as the reader will have noticed, are the 
spatial types mutually exclusive. A single place may share the 
expressive attributes of more than one of these types.149 These spatial 
types do not determine rights. They should, rather, lead courts to 
consider the special character of the place at issue, the intersection of 
speech and spatiality in that place, and the relation of that place to 
public discourse more generally. Merely thinking in terms of place 
rather than property or forum will improve the balancing of speech 
and governmental interests that already takes place in determining 
access to public spaces. It will also provide grounds for reconsidering 
the current presumption that a number of public places are not open 
to expressive activity. 
2. Getting into Public Places 
I have described elsewhere what effectively analyzing or 
“reading” place entails, and how consideration of access to place 
differs from consideration of access to property.150 I will do so only 
briefly here. Those looking for bright-line rules or a revised spatial 
formalism will be disappointed. But if the discussion of place thus far 
has demonstrated anything, it is that “place,” properly conceived, is 
too complex for such things. Let me very briefly, then, suggest the 
types of considerations that should be placed in the balance on the 
 
 148. It does not, for example, consider the phenomena of cyber-places or metaphysical 
places. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 11, at 481–84 (discussing cyberspace as 
place). 
 149. For example, the highway overpass might be an inscribed place, insofar as speakers 
are permitted to “write” or speak on it. It may, on the other hand, constitute a non-place, insofar 
as speech of any kind is barred there.  
 150. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 11. 
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side of public speech rights when courts consider the fundamental 
issue of access to place.  
The discussion that follows assumes the acceptance and 
application of the basic theory of place sketched above. The spatial 
analysis should proceed based on a conception of places as primary 
to expression, constructed, dynamic, and variable. The primary focus 
should be on the manner in which speech and spatiality intersect in 
places. More specifically, courts should analyze the nature of the 
place in question, how place relates to content, how it is being 
utilized, by whom, and in what social or political context, and how a 
denial of access to this place might affect public discourse on the 
expressive topography more generally. Access, and its scope, should 
turn on these considerations rather than on the rigid categorization of 
property. 
Let us briefly consider some examples to determine what effect 
this approach might have on the analysis of speakers’ efforts to 
access public places. In the abortion clinic cases, the Court treated 
limitations on access to listeners at abortion clinics as a simple 
application of the time, place, and manner doctrine to speech on 
public sidewalks.151 But there were in fact two distinct types of places 
in those cases. The clinics were contested places; being there was 
part of the expressive message. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his 
dissent in Hill, the clinics have effectively become “a [place] of last 
resort for those who oppose abortion.”152 Thus, the variety of access 
restrictions, such as buffer zones and personal bubbles, should have 
been more carefully scrutinized, rather than subjected to some form 
of anemic judicial scrutiny. Review of contested places requires an 
appreciation of the terms of the contest, its participants, and the 
manner in which place is used to defuse or otherwise affect the 
contest. Courts should recognize, in particular, that content 
discrimination may be lurking in this context. And if the clinics are 
indeed “places of last resort” for these speakers, some form of 
facilitation for speakers who seek to reach their intended audience 
may be required. This is precisely the sort of recognition that results 
 
 151. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 
U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 152. Hill, 530 U.S. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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from seeing places, rather than fora or properties. It should color not 
only the identification of discrete places but also the manner in which 
courts view tailoring and other aspects of spatial restrictions.  
Courts assessing fora or properties rather than places sometimes 
miss the spatial point. For example, the core issue in Hill, raised by 
the eight-foot protective bubble around clinic patrons, was not 
whether access to listeners could be restricted on the streets, but 
rather what sort of access should be permitted to the embodied place 
of the listener. As Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent in Hill, 
embodied places implicate things such as expressive immediacy and 
emotive appeal.153 Courts focusing on sidewalks obviously cannot 
appreciate the dynamism of place in this example. If they cannot see 
place itself, courts of course cannot recognize its communicative 
aspects. Unless they see and interpret place, courts also cannot 
appreciate how a spatially enforced prohibition on “counseling” near 
abortion clinics is used to target certain speakers and their messages. 
Finally, without an understanding and appreciation of the expressive 
topography, courts cannot gauge the impact of any spatial regulation 
on the ability to reach listeners in other places where they might be 
found and persuaded. They cannot, in other words, understand the 
relative importance of places.  
Similarly, the Court in Lee held that airports are properties that 
have not traditionally been open to expression. Thus, airports were 
held to be non-public fora.154 But, of course, Lee was about much 
more than solicitors’ access to airport terminals. The decision turned 
airports, and seemingly any other modern property, into non-places, 
rather than merely non-public fora. Lee actually denied speakers 
access to two places. First, they were essentially barred from the 
embodied places of listeners, as in Hill. Second, they were forced out 
of the larger place of the terminals. The Court did not seem to 
recognize, or, if it did, to care, that these speakers were now 
displaced from both malls and terminals. Again, today these are 
among the only places where large numbers of listeners can readily 
be found. Viewed in this light, the inconvenience and possibility of 
 
 153. See id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere is the speech more important than 
at the time and place where the act is about to occur.”). 
 154. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992). 
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some misconduct associated with solicitation in embodied places 
seem rather trivial. A court focusing on and interpreting place rather 
than property or forum would have forced officials to use something 
other than displacement to address such concerns. It would also have 
been reluctant to flatly pronounce that all new properties are 
presumptively off limits to expressive activity.  
Finally, limiting or denying access to other public places by 
constructing tactical places raises serious and unique expressive 
concerns. As I have explained elsewhere, the spatial tactics that are 
used to construct tactical places are not mere time, place, and manner 
regulations.155 These tactics actually create distinct places—zones, 
pens, and cages. With respect to these places, courts must be acutely 
aware that spatial restrictions are often responses to particular forms 
of expression, particular groups, or perhaps even particular points of 
view. At the least, tactical places disparately burden protest and 
dissent. They keep speakers from other public places where listeners 
can be found. Again, in terms of dynamism, courts must ask what 
these access barriers communicate about things such as protest and 
dissent. In light of the expressive character of these places, courts 
should not simply presume that these are ordinary, neutral spatial 
restrictions. Instead, they should seriously inquire whether there are 
less restrictive alternatives to building cages and placing people in 
speech pens.  
Note that two particularly problematic forum-based concepts recur 
throughout the foregoing analysis. The Court has emphasized that a 
property’s expressive future will depend to a large extent on two 
factors, namely its functions and its traditional usage. As Lee 
demonstrates, expressive rights in public places often turn 
substantially on considerations of what a property was constructed to 
do and whether there has been a tradition of governmental allowance 
of speech on that property.156 In short, forum doctrine focuses on 
property functions and traditions.  
But places have expressive functions and traditions as well. The 
primacy, dynamism, and construction of place indicate that place 
 
 155. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11. 
 156. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (noting “the lateness with which the modern air terminal has 
made its appearance”). 
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often functions in tandem with speech, not apart from it. Thus, 
merely considering what a place was originally designed to do is not 
sufficient. If it were, sidewalks, which again are designed to facilitate 
travel, would not be speech fora. As they are used by speakers, places 
take on expressive functions. In addition, places have constitutional 
traditions, not just managerial ones. When access to certain places is 
denied, these expressive traditions are fully at stake. Embodied 
places, for example, are part of a rich constitutional tradition of 
public discourse. That tradition extends back to the efforts of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to break into listeners’ personal spaces and to 
engage in solicitation in their presence, even at their homes.157 In 
cases such as Hill, Frisby, and Lee, the Court should have considered 
this tradition in determining the legitimacy of spatial access 
restrictions. Similarly, contested and tactical places should be 
considered with their historical forebears, including the many spatial 
restrictions rejected during the civil rights era, in mind. Courts must 
recognize that social movements are severely hampered by the very 
types of spatial restrictions that have now become routine in our 
public places. Without access to these places, social movements may 
not occur at all. Finally, inscribed places such as parks and 
monuments are also part of an expressive tradition, one that extends 
well beyond the immediate contest.  
In terms of the future of public expression, assembly, and petition, 
much depends on courts and officials being mindful that it is not 
merely access to property that is at stake. It is, rather, access to 
“place.” This will require developing a sense of what place is, and 
what it does in relation to expressive activity. It will require not only 
a new vision of place, but an approach to it that recognizes and 
respects its primacy, dynamism, construction, and variability. Courts 
must learn first to locate place, and then to interpret it as it intersects 
with expression.  
 
 157. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating municipal ordinances that 
prohibited distribution of handbills on public streets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938) (invalidating ordinance that forbid distribution of literature without permission of city 
official). 
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E. Time and Manner, and Place  
If “place” is, as I contend, an independent concept that is 
intimately connected to speech, we should seriously challenge its 
being joined doctrinally with things such as time and manner. This is 
a critical issue. As the Rehnquist Court’s decisions demonstrate, even 
if a speaker is able to gain initial access to a public space, his or her 
right to speak there may be sharply limited by more “local” spatial 
regulations. Time, place, and manner doctrine thus cannot be 
separated from first-order access issues. Indeed, regulations of these 
“contextual” elements are often determinative of access to public 
places. In this section, I will briefly present some arguments in favor 
of separating place from time and manner, and of applying a more 
heightened form of judicial scrutiny to spatial regulations.158  
Time, place, and manner have historically been considered aspects 
of expressive context or environment. They have been treated as 
related to speech, but only tangentially so. Under prevailing doctrine, 
the regulation of these contextual factors is subject to a rather weak 
and anemic version of intermediate scrutiny.159 So long as a 
regulation is not expressly based on content, the government need 
only state a substantial interest in regulating the time, place, or 
manner and tailor its regulation such that adequate alternative 
channels of communication remain available.160  
In truth, all of these elements can substantially affect public 
speech rights. Rationality review should not be applied to time and 
manner restrictions. But “place” is different from these other matters 
in several respects. Consequently, it should receive an even greater 
degree of judicial attention. 
First, regulating place is not merely a matter of maintaining a 
basic sense of order in public places. This may have been all there 
was to it in the early days.161 But changes to the spatial environment 
 
 158. Again, the interested reader is referred to Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 
11, for a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
 159. See Williams, supra note 82, at 644 (“The government interest and tailoring 
requirements are quite close to the rational basis standard applied to regulations that do not 
affect fundamental rights at all.”) (emphasis added). 
 160. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 161. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding that the regulation 
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brought about by conditions of modernity, the development of the 
“public forum” doctrine, and the Rehnquist Court decisions on 
expressive zoning have raised the profile of place and its importance 
to expressive rights. If place ever truly was mere context or 
background, it is certainly no longer. Without place, time and manner 
are more or less inconsequential. Place, as noted, is primary to 
expression.  
Second, given the expressiveness of place, spatial restrictions can 
often have a more substantial effect on expressive content than time 
or manner regulations. The prohibition of a particular manner of 
speaking, such as burning a draft card or posting a sign on public 
property, can indeed have a substantial impact on things such as the 
emotive quality of speech or the efficient delivery of messages. 
Unduly limiting the time during which speech is allowed can also 
substantially impact expression.162 But in either case, the essence of 
the message itself can still be conveyed, even if perhaps less 
effectively, by other means or at other times. Unless they are truly 
narrowly tailored, however, spatial regulations can effectively 
suppress speech altogether. Places currently considered “adequate” 
and “ample” alternatives under the time, place, and manner doctrine 
may in fact be miles away from intended audiences.163 Even if a 
spatial restriction does not wholly suppress a message, the 
displacement itself is expressive in a way that time and manner 
regulations are not. The fact that speakers are caged or otherwise 
displaced, for example, communicates something, symbolically, to 
those who pass by. Listeners can see and even experience spatial 
restrictions; they are evident to potential listeners in a way that time 
and manner regulations are not. 
This highlights a third distinction. Restrictions on place are often 
different in character from those on time and manner. Restrictions on 
time and manner can delay the communication of messages, reduce 
 
was necessary “‘to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure 
convenient use of the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder.’” (quoting 
State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508 (N.H. 1940))).  
 162. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (“Annoyance at ideas can be 
cloaked in annoyance at sound.”).  
 163. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 11, at 591 (discussing speech zones 
used during presidential campaign). 
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the volume at which speech is delivered, or impact such things as the 
size of placards or the activity that accompanies speech. These can be 
more than mere inconveniences to speakers. But spatial regulations 
can be so physically coercive as to chill speech altogether. This is 
particularly true of speech zones and other tactical architectures.164 
These regulations, unlike those relating to time or manner, operate 
directly on the body. They threaten specific reprisals for moving 
outside a zone that is marked by some architecture or another as 
“free.”  
Finally, content discrimination can more readily be hidden in 
spatial regulations than in time and manner ones. That is not to say, 
of course, that time and manner restrictions cannot harbor content 
discrimination. But given their nature, it is more difficult to slip 
distortion into these types of regulations. Limiting one group to a 
particularly unattractive time or prohibiting a unique form of 
expressive conduct for no apparent reason rather plainly suggests 
content discrimination. But spatial regulations are unique in this 
respect as well. They are often presented as efforts to accommodate 
speech concerns. They purport to set aside space for expressive uses 
by constructing “free speech zones.” Spatial tactics thus often give 
the appearance of facilitating speech, while, in reality, suppressing 
and chilling it. This is why spatial tactics benefit substantially from a 
presumption that place is neutral. Judges will have a much more 
difficult time identifying content discrimination with regard to place; 
unless, that is, they are encouraged to look more rigorously for it.  
In light of these differences, courts should be far more skeptical of 
spatial regulations than they are at present. Because place is primary 
to expression, they should demand some real evidence that a 
compelling interest will be served by displacing speech in the manner 
proposed. They should translate their heightened appreciation for and 
knowledge of place into careful scrutiny as to whether spatial 
regulations are, in fact, narrowly tailored. None of this is beyond 
judicial competence. Scrutiny of this sort will require attention to 
such things as the physical characteristics of places, the separation or 
distance between speakers and listeners, the forms or types of 
 
 164. See id. 
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communication possible in the place, and other meaningful 
opportunities for speakers and listeners to interact in public. This 
approach will sometimes give speakers access to listeners in 
situations that are disturbing, uncomfortable, or even dangerous. But 
these, too, are fundamental aspects of our tradition of public 
discourse. The First Amendment does not, and should not, protect us 
from these things. Place should not be used to “protect” us from 
speakers we may not wish to hear. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Public expression, assembly, and petition are integral aspects of 
our First Amendment heritage. Place has played a substantial role in 
that heritage. Some of our most important social movements, such as 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s, depended for their success on 
access to public places. First Amendment jurisprudence itself would 
have been far different had it not been for the pioneering efforts of 
groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who used public places to 
engage listeners.  
Today, however, we live in an increasingly disciplined, even 
militarized, spatial environment. Neither our physical environment 
nor our laws encourage the type of public interaction First 
Amendment theorists hale and a thriving expressive culture requires. 
The cause of material public discourse suffered major setbacks 
during the Rehnquist era. By cutting back on the “easement” on 
sidewalks and streets, placing its imprimatur on spatial tactics such as 
expressive zoning, creating “non-places,” and restricting speakers’ 
ability to enter the embodied spaces of listeners, the Court made it 
less likely that public citizens will be able to speak to, hear, or 
persuade one another in public settings.  
Regardless of the state of our technological advancement, public 
streets, sidewalks, parks, and other traditional expressive places 
remain critical components of our expressive culture. So, too, do 
more modern public places such as airports and highways. We must 
find a way to preserve expressive liberties in these and other public 
places. To do this, we must alter both our conception of place itself 
and the constitutional analysis of issues of speech and spatiality. We 
must begin by separating “place” from dated notions of property and 
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from the confines of the “public forum” doctrine. As scholars in a 
range of disciplines have concluded, place differs in material respects 
from property. Courts must spend the time locating and interpreting 
place, rather than formalistically categorizing properties. Place 
should also be segregated from its contextual cousins, time and 
manner. Place is different from these things; it should be treated as 
such.  
We must, in short, bring place into the foreground in an effort to 
preserve public expression. For those who consider the proposed re-
conceptualization of place radical, I suggest that there is no 
preordained conception of “place” for us to follow. Property is 
merely a convenient conceptual framework, not a required one. For 
those who consider the chances of taking the proposed spatial turn at 
this historical and doctrinal juncture to be slim or even none, I ask 
forbearance; in constitutional law few things are ever finally settled.  
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